On October 3 the South Pacific Defence Ministers Meeting (SPDMM) endorsed the establishment of the Pacific Response Group (PRG), a novel multinational military cooperation initiative that will seek to address the need for more efficient and effective cooperation between Pacific militaries to deliver military support to Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR).

In the coming years, the PRG will have to address challenges surrounding the potential expansion of the group and its mission, including into areas like stability operations, and Australia will need to commit greater resources to ensuring that it successfully adapts to the region's needs. It is important that the thinking, consultation and some of the planning for that starts now.

Any decisions regarding the PRG will be made by SPDMM members as a collective, but each member state will have its own perspectives on the group’s development. This report provides 12 recommendations focused on areas including resourcing, encouraging a whole-of-government support, and expansion of the group in size and in scope. The report is intended to inform policymakers in Australia as a contributing member of the PRG, but many of the recommendations could also be valuable for, and hence adopted by, other members of the group.

A summary of the recommendations contained in the report are as follows:

Recommendation 1: PRG members states should consider the need for an expansion of the PRG beginning as soon as the 2025/2026 high risk weather season and must be able to deal with concurrent disasters.

Recommendation 2: The end goal of the HADR component of the PRG should be dedicated forces from each military able to be readily deployed in immediate response to natural disasters in the region.

Recommendation 3: PRG member states should consider ways it can guarantee capabilities for PRG use in the high-risk season from Australia, New Zealand and France for much needed transport, including maritime and air assets.

Recommendation 4: The Australian government should acknowledge that the PRG is not designed to address all of Australia’s domestic HADR demands so should consider other solutions to bolster its domestic disaster response.

Recommendation 5: The Australian government should consider how a whole-of-government approach can actively coordinate across departmental initiatives so that the PRG, and other initiatives, can make the best contribution to regional environmental security concerns.

Recommendation 6: SPDMM member states participating in the PRG should address the potential for the inclusion of police units or paramilitary from countries such as Solomon Islands and Vanuatu in the future.

Recommendation 7: The PRG should think ahead and consider outlining a role for SPDMM observers such as Japan, the UK and the US in supporting the group without changing its core makeup. This could include financial support for transport, maintenance or infrastructure and supplies.

Recommendation 8: Australia should be willing and ready to support the expansion the PRG mission as desired by its member states to address instability through a coordinated multilateral response, provided this is desired by other members of SPDMM.

Recommendation 9: If there is an expansion of the mission to include stability operations, Australia should lead the way in the development of a multilateral security agreement that formalises the PRG’s approach to stability operations in any SPDMM member state.

Recommendation 10: Together, PRG members should publicly push-back against any narratives that suggest this initiative is competition driven and remind other states that successful security initiatives inevitably lead to a reduced need for other external support. Australia should also be more transparent about its concerns with a greater Chinese security presence in the region.

Recommendation 11: Australia should encourage some of the region’s key partners to support the PRG with supplies, funding and – if needed – additional vessels and aircraft for transport.

Recommendation 12: If, in the future, the PRG is requested to support alongside Chinese security forces, Australia must combat potential narratives pushed by China of welcome cooperation and partnership between Australia as a PRG-member and China in the region that legitimise a Chinese security presence while respecting the sovereign decision making of recipient countries.